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It's not Who you Are, but Who you Work
For: Limitation on the Works Made For
Hire Doctrine
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act of 19761 vests copyright ownership "in the
author or authors of [a] work."'2 Normally, the person who fixes a
work of authorship in a "tangible medium of expression" is consid-
ered the author of that work.3 However, an exception to this gen-
eral rule exists for those works which are "work[s] made for hire."'4
If a work is made for hire, "the employer or other person for whom
the work was prepared is considered the author" for copyright pur-
poses and, unless there is a written agreement providing otherwise,
"owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright." Section 101 of
the Copyright Act provides that a work can be one "for hire" in
either of two scenarios. First, pursuant to section 101(1) of the Act,
a work is one made for hire if it was "prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment. 7 Alternatively, section
101(2) provides that a work is made for hire if it falls within one of
the nine specific categories of "specially ordered or commissioned"
works enumerated in the subsection, and the parties expressly
1. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988)) [hereinafter Copyright Act or Act].
2. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
3. Id. § 102.
4. Id. § 101.
5. Id. § 201(b).
6. Id. § 101. The work made for hire provisions of section 101 provide, in pertinent
part, that a work is made for hire when it is :
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment;
or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a col-
lective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a trans-
lation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a
test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in
a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work
made for hire.
Id. § 101.
7. Id. § 101(1).
1
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agree in writing that the work would be considered one for hire.'
At issue in Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid'
was the proper construction of section 101(1).10 Primarily, the
question was whether an artist who was specially commissioned by
a non-profit organization to create a sculpture was an "employee
acting within the scope of his ... employment."1 This interpretive
problem arose because of the failure of the drafters of the Copy-
right Act to include within the Act a definition of the term "em-
ployee." In the absence of a definition, the lower federal courts had
adopted four different interpretations of the term.12 On June 5,
1989, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved the conflict
when it unanimously announced in Reid that the language, struc-
ture, and legislative history of the work made for hire provisions
require a court to use the general principles of the common law of
agency to determine who is an "employee" for purposes of section
101(1) of the Copyright Act."2
II. HISTORY OF THE CASE
A. Facts
In the fall of 1985, the Community for Creative Non-Violence
(CCNV) decided to participate in Washington, D.C.'s annual
Christmastime Pageant of Peace.' Mitch Snyder, a member and
trustee of CCNV, commissioned James Earl Reid, a Maryland art-
8. Id. § 101(2).
9. 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
11. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2168-69.
12. Some federal courts have interpreted section 101() to mean that a work is pre-
pared by an employee whenever the hiring party 'retains the right to control the product.
See Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1985); Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566
F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have adopted a
somewhat related view which would find that a work is created by an employee whenever
the hiring party exercises actual control over the creation of the work. See Aldon Accesso-
ries Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); Brunswick
Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987); Evans Newton
Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
The Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have adopted the position that the term "employee"
as found in section 101(1) should be defined as it would be under the common law of
agency. See Easter Seal- Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Lousiana, Inc. v. Play-
boy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987); Community For Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct 2166 (1989). Finally, the Ninth Circuit
recently interpreted the word "employee" in section 101(1) to refer only to formal, salaried
employees. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
13. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2178.
14. Id. at 2169.
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ist, to construct for CCNV a display dramatizing the plight of the
homeless. 15 Snyder and other members of CCNV conceived the
idea for the work, which ultimately would depict a modern day
Nativity scene in which life-sized black adults, representing the
traditional Holy Family, huddled on a streetside.' 6 The work was
to be entitled "Third World America" and the epigraph beneath
the work would read, "and still there is no room at the inn." 7 Reid
suggested the sculpture be cast in bronze at a cost of $100,000 and
projected that he could complete the statue within six to eight
months."' However, because of CCNV's limited funds and the De-
cember 12, 1985, deadline, Reid and Snyder agreed that Reid
would construct the sculpture with a less costly material, enabling
the project to be completed in time.19 Reid and Snyder agreed that
the cost of the project would not exceed $15,000 and that Reid
would contribute his services for free."0 They did not sign a con-
tract, nor was there any mention of copyright.2
Soon after recieving an advance of $3,000, Reid began to make
sketches of figures in a number of possible poses, one of which
Reid sent to Snyder at Snyder's request.22 Later, at Snyder's sug-
gestion and in an effort to accurately portray the plight of the
homeless, Reid and Snyder visited homeless shelters and observed
homeless people living on the streets of Washington, D.C."
During November and early December, Reid worked exclu-
sively on the statue, aided by different people who were paid with
CCNV funds.2 4 On various occasions during this period, CCNV
members visited Reid in his Maryland studio to check on the
statue's progress.28 However, on none of those occasions did Reid
15. Id.
16. Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1454 (D.D.C.
1987).
17. Id.
18. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2169.
19. Id. They decided to construct the statue with "'Design Cast 62,' a synthetic sub-
stance that could meet CCNV's monetary and time constraints, could be tinted to resemble
bronze, and could withstand the elements." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. There was a discrepancy in the testimony of Reid and Snyder as to why Reid
sent the sketches to Snyder. Snyder testified that he had requested the sketch so that he
could give his approval to Reid's ideas. Id. Reid, meanwhile, claimed he sent the sketch to
Snyder only so that Snyder could use it for fundraising purposes. Id.
23. Id. After Snyder indicated to Reid that homeless persons recline on steam grates
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and the CCNV members discuss copyright.2
Reid delivered the statue to Washington, D.C. on December
24, 1985, where it was joined to a steam grate pedestal2 7 and placed
on display.28 At that time, Snyder paid Reid the final installment
of the agreed price of $15,000.29 CCNV displayed the statue for a
month and, in late January of 1986, returned the statue to Reid for
minor repairs. Later, while the statue was still in Reid's possession,
Reid voiced his objection to Snyder's plan to display the statue
around the country for fundraising purposes, claiming that the
statue's material would not withstand excessive travel.30 Snyder
declined Reid's suggestion to recast the statue in bronze and, in
March of 1986, asked Reid to return the sculpture.3' Reid refused
and instead filed a certificate of copyright registration.3 ' Snyder,
acting for CCNV, immediately filed a competing certificate of re-
gistration and then filed suit against Reid."
B. Procedure Below
Snyder and CCNV brought suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia seeking an injunction to force
Reid to return the sculpture to CCNV and a declaratory judgment
determining ownership of the copyright in the sculpture.3 4 Follow-
ing a two-day bench trial, the district court held that, pursuant to
section 101(1) of the Act, "Third World America" was a work
made for hire and Snyder, as acting trustee for CCNV, was the
exclusive owner of the copyright. 5 The district court reasoned that
Reid had been an employee within the meaning of section 101(1)
because Snyder and other CCNV members had contributed suffi-
ciently to the inception and creation of the work and had directed
Reid's work in such a way that the work represented the result
26. Id. at 2169-70.
27. CCNV prepared the steam grate pedestal, independent of any assistance from





32. Id. Reid also announced his intention to take the statue on a tour which would be
shorter than the one CCNV had proposed. Id.
33. Id. CCNV named Reid's photographer Ronal Purtee as a defendant in the suit as
well; however, Purtee never appeared. Id.
34. Id.
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which CCNV, not Reid, had wanted.3" Reid appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit reversed, holding that, because under the rules of
agency law Reid was not CCNV's employee but instead was an in-
dependent contractor, the statue, since sculpture does not fall
within one of the nine categories of specially commissioned works
enumerated in section 101(2), is not a work made for hire. 7 In an
opinion authored by Judge Ruth Bader Ginsberg, the court of ap-
peals, after recognizing that the case presented an issue of first im-
pression in the D.C. Circuit, adopted the interpretation of section
101(1) which would apply the common law of agency to determine
who was an employee for purposes of the statute, an approach
which the Fifth Circuit had advocated in Easter Seal.Society for
Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy En-
terprises.38 Using that approach, the court of appeals found that
section 101 created "a simple dichotomy in fact between employees
and independent contractors."'" With the common law of agency
as its primary guide, the court of appeals concluded that Reid was
an independent contractor and that therefore the work was not
prepared by an employee under section 101(1).' o Further, the court
of appeals concluded that, because sculpture was not among the
nine categories enumerated in section 101(2), section 101(2) like-
wise did not render the sculpture a "work made for hire."'
Although concluding that the sculpture was not a work made
for hire, the court of appeals suggested that the work may have
been jointly authored by the parties, giving CCNV some rights to
the copyright in the work.'2 Consequently, the court of appeals re-
manded the case to the district court to allow that court to make a
finding as to whether the sculpture was a joint work.43 However, in
the interim, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict that existed among the federal circuits as to the proper
construction of the word "employee" in section 101(1.) of the Act."
36. Id. at 1456-57.
37. Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1494 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
38. Id. at 1487 (citing Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisi-
ana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280
(1988)).
39. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1492.
40. Id. at 1494.
41. Id. See supra note 6 for the text of section 101(2).
42. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1497.
43. Id. at 1499.
44. Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988).
19891
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III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the court of ap-
peals.4 Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall initially delineated
the statutory framework underlying the work made for hire doc-
trine.46 Quoting section 101 of the Copyright Act," he recognized
that a work is one for hire under two sets of circumstances: (1)
where the work is created by an employee acting within the scope
of his or her employment or (2) where the work is one of the spe-
cially ordered or commissioned works enumerated in section
101(2), and the parties agree in writing that the work is to be con-
sidered a work made for hire.4 8 After illuminating the dichotomy
created by the two subsections of section 101, Justice Marshall
quickly narrowed the issue by concluding that the statue, as sculp-
ture is not one of the nine categories enumerated in section 101(2),
clearly is not a work made for hire under that subsection. 9 With
section 101(2) inapplicable, he reasoned, "the dispositive inquiry in
the case ... is whether 'Third World America' is a 'work prepared
by an employee within the scope of his . . . employment under §
101M(1. 50
Although apparently necessitating nothing more than a deter-
mination of whether Reid created the statue as an employee labor-
ing within the scope of his employment, the inquiry was compli-
cated because, as Justice Marshall points out, the Copyright Act
does not define the term "employee."'" He noticed that because
the statute lacked an express definition, four different construc-
tions of the word had emerged from the lower federal courts.2 In
order to create a uniform federal standard, the Court's task essen-
tially was to choose among these interpretations.
A. The Language of Section 101(1)
Justice Marshall began his interpretation of section 101(1) by
inspecting its language. After reiterating that the statute fails to
45. Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
46. Id. at 2171.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
48. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2171. See supra note 6 for the text of the work made for hire
provisions in section 101.
49. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2171.
50. Id. at 2171-72,
51. Id. at 2172.
52. Id. See supra note 12 (discussing the various interpretations of section 101(1)
adopted by the lower federal courts).
53. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2172.
[Vol. 7:117
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define the term "employee" or the phrase "scope of employment,"
Justice Marshall argued that this definitional void was of no conse-
quence because when "'Congress uses terms that have accumu-
lated settled meaning under ... the common law, a court must
infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to
incorporate the established meaning of these terms.' " On previ-
ous occasions, Justice Marshall argued, the Court has concluded
that where Congress used the word "employee" in a statute, but
failed to define the word, Congress intended to "describe the con-
ventional master-servant relationship as understood by common
law agency doctrine." s In fact, he continued, "Congress' intent to
incorporate the agency law definition is suggested by § 101(1)'s use
of the term, 'scope of employment,' a widely used term of art in
agency law." 5" As a result of this established tradition of constru-
ing the term "employee," and because nothing in the text of the
work made for hire provisions indicates that Congress intended a
different construction, Justice Marshall concluded that the D.C.
Circuit was correct in its conclusion "that the term 'employee'
should be understood in light of the general common law of
agency."
6 7
B. The Alternative Tests Do Not Apply
In adopting the interpretation of section 101(1) which the
Fifth Circuit 5s and the court of appeals below had advocated,6 9
Justice Marshall rejected the alternative interpretations of the sec-
tion. 0 First, he rejected the right to control the product test be-
cause it incorrectly focuses on the relationship between the hiring
54. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)).
55. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2172 (citing Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318, 322-23
(1979); Baker v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959) (per curiam); Robinson v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94 (1915)).
56. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2172.
57. Id. at 2173. Justice Marshall remarked that the terms were t gain their meaning
from the general common law of agency and not from the law of any particular state. Id.
Doing so, he claimed, would further the goal of achieving a uniform application of the fed-
eral copyright statute. Id.
58. Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy
Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987).
59. Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
60. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2173. CCNV had urged the Court to adopt either the right to
control the product test or the actual control test. Id. Reid and various amici also had sug-
gested to the Court that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation-limiting employee status to
formal, salaried employees-was a proper construction of the statute. Id. at 2174 n.8.
1989]
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party6' and the product rather than the relationship between the
hiring party and the hired party.2 Justice Marshall also found the
test unsupportable in light of the structure of section 101.63 Con-
gress, he claims, created a dichotomy in section 101 by which a
work can become a work made for hire in two circumstances-if it
is prepared by an employee or if it is one of the specially commis-
sioned or ordered works enumerated in section 101(2) and is the
subject of a written agreement." The right to control the product
test, Justice Marshall argued, renders this dichotomy irrelevant as
it would make any specially ordered or commissioned work which
is created under the control of the hiring party a work made for
hire under section 101(1).15 Were that the proper interpretation, he
claimed, section 101(2) would be superfluous as "many works that
could satisfy § 101(2) would already have been deemed works for
hire under § 101(1)."l
Justice Marshall was equally unimpressed with the actual con-
trol test which the Second Circuit originally had articulated in Al-
don Accessories Ltd. v. Speigel, Inc.8 It too, Justice Marshall
claimed, was unsupportable in light of the language of the stat-
ute.68 In his eyes, section 101 already included a clear dichotomy
between works prepared by an employee and those works which
are commissioned.6 9 The adoption of the actual control test, he
concluded, only would create an unnecessary second dichotomy by
drawing a distinction between commissioned works which are cre-
ated under the actual control of the hiring parties and those which
are not."0
Finally, Justice Marshall considered and rejected the interpre-
tation of section 101(1) which the Ninth Circuit had adopted in
Dumas v. Grommerman.7 In Dumas, the Ninth Circuit con-
strued the term "employee" in section 101(1) to refer only to a
61. The hiring party is the party who invokes the services of another-the hired
party-to create the work in question. Alternatively, the hiring party may be referred to as
the commissioning party.





67. Id. (citing Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984)).
68. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2174.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2174 n.8.
72. 856 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
[Vol. 7:117
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formal, salaried employee. Although conceding that there is some
support for this interpretation in the legislative history, Justice
Marshall again concluded that the language of the statute does not
support such a construction. 3
C. Legislative History Supports the Court's Interpretation
Justice Marshall also argued that his construction of section
101(1), and its undefined terms, is supported by the legislative his-
tory of the Copyright Act of 1976.1" He noticed that the 1976 over-
haul of the copyright statute was the end result of "two decades of
negotiation by representatives of creators and copyright-using in-
dustries, supervised by the Copyright office and, to a lesser extent,
by Congress."" After tracing this lengthy period of negotiation and
compromise in detailed fashion, Justice Marshall was convinced
that two things remained unchanged throughout, each of which
support his construction of the statute:
First, interested parties and Congress at all times viewed works
by employees and commissioned works by independent contrac-
tors as separate entities. Second, in using the term "employee,"
the parties and Congress meant to refer to a hired party in a
conventional employment relationship.76
The legislative history was significant, Justice Marshall believed,
because it clearly indicated that Congress intended to create two
separate methods by which a work could become a work made for
hire-one for employees and one for independent contractors."
Additionally, he continued, the legislative history supported the
clear message of the statutory language, namely that Congress in-
tended for a commissioned work to become a work made for hire
only if it qualified under one of the nine enumerated categories in
section 101(2), irrespective of the commissioning party's control.78
CCNV advanced a contrary interpretation of the history lead-
ing to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976. 7 CCNV argued
that in enacting the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act Congress
intended to "incorporate a line of cases decided under the 1909 Act
73. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2174 n.8. Justice Marshall argued that "[t]he Act does not say
'formal' or 'salaried' employee, but simply 'employee.'" Id.
74. Id. at 2174-78.
75. Id. at 2174.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2176.
78. Id. at 2176-77.
79. Id. at 2177.
19891
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holding that an employment relationship exists sufficient to give
the hiring party copyright ownership whenever that party has the
right to control or supervise the artist's work."' Essentially CCNV
claimed that there was no evidence in the 1976 Act or in the Act's
legislative history indicating that Congress intended to abandon
the control standard set out in those cases."1
Justice Marshall rejected CCNV's interpretation as unpersua-
sive, primarily for two reasons.82 First, he believed CCNV's reli-
ance on Congress' silence to argue that section 101(1) incorporated
one of the control tests was misplaced because of the clarity of the
language and the structure of section 101.13 Second, Justice Mar-
shall was unconvinced that Congress intended to incorporate the
line of cases upon which CCNV relied because, he reasoned, the
text of the work for hire provisions was agreed upon, in what was
essentially its final form, prior to the decision in any of those
cases.84 In succinct fashion, Justice Marshall concluded that "Con-
gress certainly could not have 'jettisoned' a line of cases that had
not yet been decided." 8
Furthermore, Justice Marshall claimed that construing the
statute as CCNV advocated would undermine Congress' "para-
mount goal in revising the 1976 Act of enhancing predictability
and certainty of copyright ownership."8' 6 He argued that the ability
of negotiating parties to know with certainty at the outset the ex-
tent and nature of their relationship is crucial to avoiding subse-
quent disagreements over a copyright." However, because the ac-
tual control test advocated by CCNV turns on how much control
the hiring party exercises throughout the creation process, Justice
Marshall claimed that were the Court to adopt it parties would not
know until late in the process whether the hiring party's control
was sufficient to render the work one made for hire.s" As a result,
80. Id. (citing Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d
Cir. 1974); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 997 (1972); Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970); Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369
F.2d 565, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1966)).





86. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEws 5659).
87. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2177-78.
88. Id. at 2178.
[Vol. 7:117
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he reasoned, each party would have to guess whether a work will
fall within 101(1). 89 Clearly, he claimed, such a situation was not
intended by the drafters of the statute who sought to ensure pre-
dictability through advance planning. 0
In the end, Justice Marshall concluded that the language,
structure, and legislative history of the work made for hire provi-
sions do not support the conclusion that a hiring party's right to
control, or actual control of, a commissioned work renders the
work one by an "employee."' Instead, he remarked, a court assess-
ing whether a work is one made for hire must first determine, using
the principles of the general common law of agency, whether the
work was created by an employee or an independent contractor.2
Only after that determination, he pointed out, could a court apply
the applicable subsection of section 101-subsection (1) if the
court concludes that the creator is an employee and subsection (2)
if the creator is an independent contractor.9 "
D. The Court Holds That Reid Was An Independent
Contractor
After Justice Marshall announced the proper method of inter-
preting section 101(1), he was left to determine, applying the gen-
eral common law of agency, whether Reid was an employee work-
ing within the scope of his employment when he created "Third
World America." Justice Marshall claimed that primarily the in-
quiry required a consideration of Reid's control over the manner
and means by which the statue had been created.9 4 Additionally,
he enumerated several other factors, none of which is determina-








95. Id. Justice Marshall suggested consideration of the following factors:
[T]he skill required; the source of the intrumentalities and tools; the location of
the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hir-
ing party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the ex-
tent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method
of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the
work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party
is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the
hired party.
Id. at 2178-79. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) (providing a non-
19891
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Applying the factors to the facts, Justice Marshall concluded
that Reid was an independent contractor and not CCNV's em-
ployee." Although conceding that CCNV did exercise enough con-
trol over Reid's work to guarantee that the finished product was
consonant with their specifications, Justice Marshall claimed that
the amount of control is not dispositive. 7 In this case, he argued,
all the other factors militate strongly against a finding that Reid
was an employee.9' For example, he noted that Reid was a sculptor
by trade and that CCNV was not even in the sculpting business.9'
Additionally, Justice Marshall commented, Reid supplied his own
tools and worked in his own studio in Baltimore-separated from
CCNV which was housed in Washington, D.C.100 Further, he
claimed that Reid was retained for a very short period of time and
that at no time did CCNV ever have the right to assign additional
tasks to him.'01 Also, Justice Marshall noted that Reid was free to
choose when to work and was permitted to select his own assist-
ants.102 Finally, he pointed out that Reid was compensated upon
completion of the job, an arrangement frequently used to pay an
independent contractor. 03
In sum, Justice Marshall concluded that the factors over-
whelmingly indicated that Reid was not an employee but rather an
independent contractor.0'4 Reid being an independent contractor,
he reasoned, "Third World America" only could be a work made
for hire if CCNV could fit it within the parameters of section
101(2), a task CCNV conceded it could not achieve.' 0
The Supreme Court merely affirmed the D.C. Circuit's inter-
pretation of the word employee in the work made for hire provi-
sion of section 101. The court of appeals order remanding the case
for a determination of whether CCNV was a joint author was not
before the Court.'" Therefore, in accord with the D.C. Circuit's
order,"" the Supreme Court remanded to the district court for a
exclusive list of factors relevant to determining whether a hired party is an employee).









105. Id. at 2179-80.
106. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2180 n.32.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
[Vol. 7:117
12
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 6
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss1/6
CCNV v. REID
trial on the joint author issue."' 8
IV. CONCLUSION
In CCNV v. Reid the Supreme Court settled the conflict which
arose among the lower federal courts over the proper interpreta-
tion of the word employee within the work made for hire provision
in section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976. Specifically, the Court
held that the word employee should be construed as it would be
under the common law of agency. Although the Supreme Court's
interpretation has settled the issue for the lower federal courts,
Congress currently is considering legislation which would provide
an express definition of the word employee within the statute.""
Celeste A. Siblesz*
108. The parties are going forward with discovery in an effort to prepare for trial.
Telephone interview with Robert Allen Garrett, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C., attor-
ney for CCNV (March 13, 1990). Although the parties are attempting to resolve the case
through arbitration, the case has been set for trial in April 1990 before U.S. District Judge
Thomas Jackson. Id.
109. S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced June 22, 1989).
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